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Abstract—The pervasive nature of cloud-enabled big data 
storage solutions introduces new challenges in the identification, 
collection, analysis, preservation and archiving of digital 
evidences. Investigation of such complex platforms to locate and 
recover traces of criminal activities is a time-consuming process. 
Hence, cyber forensics researchers are moving towards 
streamlining the investigation process by locating and 
documenting residual artefacts (evidences) of forensic value of 
users’ activities on cloud-enabled big data platforms, in order to 
reduce the investigation time and resources involved in a real-
world investigation.  In this paper, we seek to determine the data 
remnants of forensic value for Syncany private cloud storage 
service, a popular storage engine for big data platforms. We 
demonstrate the types and the locations of the artefacts that can 
be forensically recovered. Findings from this research contribute 
to an in-depth understanding of cloud-enabled big data storage 
forensics, which can result in reduced time and resources spent in 
real-world investigations involve Syncany-based cloud platforms.  
 
Index Terms—Green forensics, big data forensics, cloud 
forensics, Syncany forensics 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ig data and cloud computing are two information and 
communications technology (ICT) trends in recent years. 
For example, a 2013 survey by the International Data 
Corporation (IDC) predicted that the cloud computing 
spending will exceed USD 107 billion, and will drive 17% of 
the IT product expenditures by 2017 [1]. Gartner [2] also 
predicted that the cloud computing market will be worth more 
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than USD 1.1 trillion by 2017 as more big data platforms and 
big data analytical solutions are deployed over cloud storage 
services. 
There are, however, situations where public clouds are not 
suitable to host the big data platforms (e.g. inadequate privacy 
protection for data). Public cloud users are often billed for the 
resources consumed, including the storage input output (I/O), 
CPUs and memory, and the cost can become prohibitively 
expensive in storing, accessing and analysing high velocity, 
variety, veracity and volume data. There were also concerns 
about Cloud Service providers (CSPs) being able to infer or 
profile users based on the hosted / stored data [3]–[5]. Thus, it 
is unsurprising that cloud and big data security and privacy are 
current research focus [6]–[15]. Data owners in industries such 
as healthcare and banking are also subject to exacting 
regulatory requirements, which restrict the outsourcing of the 
data for storage and analysis. The concerns are compounded in 
the recent leakage of the PRISM and MUSCULAR 
surveillance programs that allegedly enable government and 
law enforcement agencies to tap into CSPs’ data centres 
without a search warrant [16]. Therefore, in-house private 
dedicated cloud storage services have become an ideal 
solution for big data platforms. 
Cloud forensics, an emerging research trend, has real-world 
implications for both criminal investigations and civil 
litigations [17]. Due to the nature of cloud-enabled big data 
storage solutions (e.g. data physically stored in distributed 
servers), identification of residual evidences may be a ‘finding 
a needle in a haystack’ exercise [18]–[21]. Even if the data 
could be located, traditional evidence collection tools, 
techniques and practices are unlikely to be adequate [22]. 
These issues are escalated in cross-jurisdictional 
investigations, which could prohibit the transfer of evidential 
data due to the lack of cross-nation legislative agreements in 
place [23]–[26]. Overcoming these investigation challenges 
demands significant time and resources of an investigation 
team [27].  
In this paper, we extend our previous work [28]
1
 seeking to 
identify potential artefacts that remain on client devices and 
cloud servers involving the use of Syncany as a private cloud 
storage solution supporting big-data platforms. We attempt to 
answer following questions: 
1. What residual artefacts can be recovered from the hard disk 
and memory of using Syncany desktop clients, and the 
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locations of the data remnants on a Windows 8.1, Ubuntu 
14.04.1 LTS (Ubuntu), and Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 (Mac 
OS) client device? 
2. What data of forensics interest can be recovered from a 
cloud server hosting Syncany private cloud storage service 
and the location of the data remnants on an Ubuntu 14.04.1 
LTS server? 
3. What data of forensics interest can be collected from the 
network traffic communications between Syncany clients and 
servers? 
We describe related works and Syncany private cloud 
service in the next two sections. Section  IV outlines our 
research methodology and experiment environment setup. In 
Sections  V and  VI, we discuss findings from the clients and 
servers, respectively. Section  VII summarises the research 
findings. Finally, in Section  VIII, we conclude the paper and 
outline potential future research areas.  
II. RELATED WORK  
Due to the underlying legal challenges and complexity 
involved in cross-jurisdictional cloud forensic investigations, 
Marty [29] and Shields et al. [30] proposed a proactive 
application-level logging mechanism, designed to log 
information of forensics interest which can also be used in 
incident response. Forensic researchers such as Dykstra and 
Sherman [31], Gebhardt
 
and Reiser [32], Quick et al. [25], and 
Martini and Choo [33] have also presented frameworks and 
prototype implementations to support collection of evidential 
materials using Application Programming Interfaces (API) 
from a variety of cloud storage platforms. Although data 
collection using APIs could potentially reduce interactions 
with the CSPs, it could be limited by the APIs’ features set 
[33]. 
Quick and Choo [34] and Teing et al. [35] studied the 
integrity of data downloaded from the web and desktop clients 
of Dropbox, Google Drive, Skydrive, and Symform and 
identified that the act of downloading data from client 
applications does not tamper the contents of the files, despite 
changes in file creation/modification times. Other cloud 
applications such as Evernote [36], Amazon S3 [36], Dropbox 
[36], [37], Google Drive [36], [38], Microsoft Skydrive [39], 
Amazon Cloud Drive [40], BitTorrent Sync [41], SugarSync 
[42], Ubuntu One [43], huBic [44], Syncany [28], Symform 
[35], as well as mobile cloud apps [45], [46] have also been 
examined. These forensics studies located artefacts of client 
applications from the user settings and application data resided 
on the media storage through keyword search. Quick and 
Choo [37]–[39] also identified that data erasing tools such as 
Eraser and CCleaner do not completely remove the data 
remnants from Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft 
SkyDrive.  
The first cloud forensic framework was proposed by 
Martini and Choo [47], which was derived based upon the 
frameworks of McKemmish [48] and NIST [49]. The 
framework was used to investigate ownCloud [50], Amazon 
EC2 [51], VMWare [33], and XtreemFS [52]. Quick et al. [25] 
further extended and validated the four-stage framework using 
SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive, and ownCloud. Chung et 
al. [36] proposed a methodology for cloud investigation on 
Windows, Mac OS, iOS, and Android devices. The 
methodology was then used to investigate Amazon S3, Google 
Docs, and Evernote. Scanlon et al. [53] outlined a 
methodology for remote acquisition of evidence from 
decentralised file synchronisation network which utilised to 
investigate BitTorrent Sync [54], [55]. In another study, Teing 
et al. [56] proposed a methodology for investigating the newer 
BitTorrent Sync application (version 2.0) or any third party or 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications. Do et 
al. [57] proposed an adversary model for digital forensics, and 
they demonstrated how such an adversary model can be used 
to investigate mobile devices (e.g. Android smartwatch –  Do 
et al. [58] and apps). Ab Rahman et al. [59], on the other hand, 
proposed a conceptual forensic-by-design framework to 
integrate forensics tools and best practices in the development 
of cloud systems. Tzuen et.al. [27], discussed about 
opportunities and challenges in streamlining digital 
investigation by referring to research that identified and 
documented residual artefacts. 
The majority of existing published works in the field of 
cloud forensics have focused on client investigations on public 
cloud infrastructures. This paper is one of few studies which 
focus on both client and server forensics. Such a study may 
assist in reducing the carbon footprints of investigation cases 
involving private cloud storage solutions.  
III. BACKGROUND 
Syncany is a popular open source and cross-platform cloud 
storage solution written in Java and supports data storage on 
different backend media (e.g., FTP, Box.net, WebDAV and 
SFTP, Amazon S3, Google Storage, IMAP, Local, Picasa and 
Rackspace Cloud Files). Hence, it does not require a server-
side software to be installed for deployment [60]. The data 
synchronisation is facilitated by the sync link or repo
2
 URL 
(similar to the concept of BitTorrent Sync, with the difference 
being that Syncany uses a central storage infrastructure). 
Syncany encrypts the sync files locally (using 128-bit 
AES/GCM encryption) before uploading them to the central 
(offsite) storage (by default); hence, only clients in possession 
of the password can access repositories. The data model 
consists of three main entities as follows [60]: 
 Versioning: Syncany captures different versions of a 
file and keeps track of the changes using metadata 
such as date, time, size and checksums. There are 
three primary versioning concepts, which are 
database versions, file histories, and file versions. A 
database version represents the point in time when 
the file tree is captured. Each database version 
contains a list of file histories, representing the 
identity of a file. Each file history contains a 
collection of file versions, representing the 
incarnations of a file. 
 Deduplication/Chunking: Syncany uses data 
deduplication technique to break individual files into 
 
2 In Syncany, a repository (or commonly known as a repo) refers to a dumb 
storage i.e., a folder storing the packaged data and metadata about a sync 
folder in the backend system [60]. 
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small chunks on the client. The chunks are 
represented in data blobs (each about 8-32 KB in 
size), which are identified by their checksum. 
 Multichunking: Individual chunks are grouped into 
multichunks, compressed and encrypted before being 
uploaded to the offsite storage. 
Fig.  1 shows an example of logical data model of a 
Syncany repository. The entities are stored locally in the 
form of plain-old-Java-object (POJOs) in the 
org.syncany.database package and tables are stored in the 
local HSQLDB-based database in .XML format [61].  
Syncany uses a command line interface by default, but users 
can manually install a plugin which supports graphical user 
interface (GUI) as well. Syncany commands of forensic 
interest are as follows [62]: 
 sy init: To initialise the repository for a new sync 
directory. It creates a sync-directory-specific 
config.xml and repo file. The former holds the local 
configuration information while the latter contains 
the chunking/crypto details required to initialise the 
remote repository. This command also generates the 
sync link in two formats: a commonly used encrypted 
link structured such as syncany://storage/1/<master-
salt>/<encrypted-config>, where both <master-salt> 
and <encrypted-config> are base58 encoded; a 
plaintext link structured such as 
syncany://storage/1/not-encrypted/<plaintext-
config>, where the <plaintext-config> is a base58-
encoded representation of the storage/connection 
config. 
 sy connect: To connect to an existing repository using 
the sync link or manually using the repo URL. This 
command is similar to sy init, with the difference 
being that it downloads the repo files from a remote 
storage. 
 sy status: Lists changes made to the local sync files 
by comparing the local file tree (e.g., last modified 
dates and file sizes) with the local database. 
 sy up: Detects changes in the local sync directory 
(using the ‘sy status’ command), indexes new files 
and uploads changes to the remote repository (using 
the ‘sy up’ command). File changes are packaged 
into new multichunks and uploaded to an offsite 
storage, alongside the delta metadata database. 
 sy ls-remote: Queries the remote storage and lists the 
client database versions that have not yet been 
downloaded/processed. 
 sy down: Detects file changes made by other clients 
(as identified by the ‘sy ls-remote’ command). The 
command first downloads the metadata of relevance. 
Then, it evaluates which multichunks are changed or 
required. Finally, it downloads and arranges the 
multichunks according to the vector clocks, when 
necessary. 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Similar to Quick and Choo [37]–[39] and Teing et al. [35], 
[63] Our test environments consist of four (4) VMware 
Workstations (VMs), one (1) for server and three (3) for 
desktop clients as detailed in Table I. The VMs were hosted 
using VMware Fusion Professional version 7.0.0 (2103067) 
on a Macbook Pro (Late 2012) running Mac OS X Mavericks 
10.9.5, with a 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB of 
RAM. As explained by Quick and Choo [37]–[39], virtual 
environments are preferred for examination of cloud 
applications. It is noteworthy that the Syncany application 
does not require an account, and hence no user account was 
created. The 3111
th
 email 
messages of the Berkeley Enron email dataset (downloaded fr
om http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/enron_email.html) were 
used to create a set of sample files and saved in .RTF, .TXT, 
.DOCX, .JPG (print screen), .ZIP, and .PDF formats, 
providing a basis for replication of the experiments in future. 
The set of sample files were placed in a new directory on the 
clients’ workstations, before being uploaded to the servers, 
which subsequently being downloaded to the corresponding 
client devices. 
In our experiments, we conducted a predefined set of 
activities to simulate various real world scenarios of using 
Syncany private cloud storage service. These included 
installation and uninstallation of the client applications as well 
as accessing, uploading, downloading, viewing, deleting, and 
unsyncing the sync files. A snapshot was undertaken of the 
VM workstations prior and after each experiment. Wireshark 
was deployed on the host machine to capture the 
communication network traffic. For the purpose of this 
research, we used WebDAV as the carrying protocol to enable 
 
Fig.  1. Logical data model of a Syncany repository (Adapted from [12]). 
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the study of the network’s inner workings. Other forensic tools 
prepared for experiments are highlighted in Table II. The 
experiments were repeated at thrice (at different dates) to 
ensure consistency of findings. 
The reliability of digital evidences rest upon the ability of the 
practitioners to adhere to generally accepted principles, 
standards, guidelines, procedures, and best practices [49], 
[64]. In this research, we adopted the cloud forensics 
framework suggested by Martini and Choo [47] for our 
investigation as follow: 
1. Evidence source identification and preservation. We 
identified the physical hardware of interest, which contained 
the virtual disk (VMDK) and memory (VMEM) files in each 
VM folder. Then, we created a forensic copy of the VMDK 
and VMEM files in E01 container and raw image file (dd) 
formats respectively. For all the forensic images created, we 
calculated the MD5 and a SHA1 hash values for each original 
copy and subsequently verified for each working copy.  
2. Collection. We extracted test data that matched the search 
terms ‘syncany and ‘enron’ in the hard disk images. These 
included SQLite databases, Apple Property List (PLIST) files, 
event logs, shortcuts, thumbnail cache, and Windows prefetch, 
$MFT, $LogFile and $UsnJrnl system files. Data from the 
physical memory dumps were collected using Volatility, 
Photorec file carver, and HxD Hex Editor; network captures 
Wireshark and Netminer. Similar to the first stage, for all the 
extracted files, we calculated the MD5 and a SHA1 hash 
values for each original copy and subsequently verified for 
each working copy. 
3. Examination and analysis. This phase is concerned with the 
assessment and extraction of the evidential information from 
the collected data. We seek to recover the following artefacts 
of evidential value from client devices: 
 Sync and file management metadata – The property 
information generated by the Syncany client to 
TABLE I 
 TOOLS PREPARED FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Tool Usage 
FTK Imager Version 3.2.0.0 To create a forensic image of the .VMDK files. 
dd version 1.3.4-1 To produce a bit-for-bit image of the .VMEM files. 
Autopsy 3.1.1 To parse the file system, produce directory listings, as well as extracting/analysing the files, Windows registry, swap 
file/partition, and unallocated space of the forensic images. 
raw2vmdk To create .VMDK files from raw dd image. 
HxD Version 1.7.7.0 To conduct keyword searches in the unstructured datasets. 
Volatility 2.4 To extract the running processes and network information from the physical memory dumps, dumping files from the 
memory space of the Syncany client applications, and detecting the memory space of a string (using the ‘pslist’, 
‘netstat’/’netscan’, ‘memdump’ and ‘yarascan’ functions). 
SQLite Browser Version 
3.4.0 
To view the contents of SQLite database files. 
Photorec 7.0 To data carve the unstructured datasets. 
File juicer 4.45 To extract files from files. 
BrowsingHistoryView v.1.60 To analyse the web browsing history. 
Thumbcacheviewer Version 
1.0.2.7 
To examine the Windows thumbnail cache. 
Windows Event Viewer 
Version 1.0 
To view the Windows event logs. 
Console Version 10.10 (543) To view log files. 
Windows File Analyser 
2.6.0.0 
To analyse the Windows prefetch and link files. 
NTFS Log Tracker To parse and analyse the $LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl New Technology File System (NTFS) files. 
SQL Workbench/J Build 118. To view the contents of Hyper SQL Database  (HSQLDB). 
 
 
TABLE II 
 SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Server configurations Client configurations 
Ubuntu Server 
Operating system : Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS 
Virtual memory size: 1GB 
Virtual storage size: 20GB 
Web application: Apache 2 
Storage type: WebDAV 
Database server: HSQL Database Engine 2.3.0 
IP address/URL: http://172.16.38.180/webdav 
Windows Client 
Operating system: Windows 8.1 Professional (Service Pack 2, 64-bit, build 9600). 
Virtual memory size: 2GB 
Virtual storage size: 20GB 
Client application: Syncany 0.4.6-alpha 
Plugins installed: WebDAV and GUI 
Ubuntu Client 
Operating system: Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS 
Virtual memory size: 1GB 
Virtual storage size: 20GB 
Client application: Syncany 0.4.6-alpha 
Plugins installed: WebDAV and GUI 
Mac OS Client 
Operating system: Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 
Virtual memory size: 1GB 
Virtual storage size: 60GB 
Client application: Syncany 0.4.6-alpha 
Plugins installed: WebDAV and GUI 
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facilitate the synchronisation process with the hardware 
hosting the cloud environment. These include the 
node/peer IDs, usernames, device names, folder/file 
IDs, share keys (if any), and other property information 
that can facilitate file-to-device and file-to-user 
mappings. 
 Authentication and encryption metadata – Artefacts 
describing the encryption algorithm, public/private 
keys or certificates, encryption salt, initialization 
vectors (IVs), password hashes, login URL, and 
(possibly) plaintext credentials that could provide the 
opportunity to login to the user’s online account or 
undertake offline brute-force attacks to obtain the login 
password.   
 Cloud transaction logs – Records of user actions 
(install, uninstall, create user account, file upload, file 
download, file modification, file delete, login, logoff, 
etc.) made to the cloud instance, which are often 
accompanied by the directory path and the timestamp 
information useful for timeline analysis. 
 Data storage – Actual storage or temporary holding 
place (e.g., the application generated sync/archive 
folders, OS and web browser’s thumbnail caches, trash 
folders, and unallocated space) that may be relied upon 
for recovering the synced files in case the cloud 
environment is not accessible or the actual copies have 
been deleted. 
 Network captures – Copies of network packets 
transmitted between the client and the hardware hosting 
the cloud environment that contain the digital 
fingerprints of the user actions. 
 Volatile memory dumps – Volatile memory is a 
potential source of many residual artefacts contributing 
to extended investigation of above mentioned items 
[65]. 
We seek to recover the following artefacts of evidential value 
from the server: 
 Administrative and file management metadata – 
The server application generated instances that provide 
copies of the sync and file management as well as 
authentication and encryption metadata of the clients. 
 Cloud logging and authentication data: Records of 
cloud transaction and authentication events/requests 
made by the clients to the cloud hosting instance, which 
are often accompanied with identifying information 
such as node IDs, logical addresses, session IDs, and 
timestamps that will facilitate provenance 
determination. 
 Data repositories - The data uploaded by the users to 
the server (typically present in encrypted chunks or 
blocks), which may assist a practitioner in recovering 
the synced files from the cloud hosting environment. 
4. Reporting and presentation. This final phase relates to the 
preparation and presentation of the information resulting from 
the analysis phase. As observed by Cahyani et al. [66]–[68], it 
is important for forensics examiners to articulate and explain 
complex and technical forensic terminologies to the judiciary 
and juries in order for them to understand “how these crimes 
were committed, what digital evidence is and where it may 
exist, and how the process of digital evidence collection was 
undertaken by the forensic investigators” [69]. 
V. SYNCANY ANALYSIS ON DESKTOP CLIENTS 
Inspection of the directory listings determined that artefacts of 
the Syncany client could be predominantly located in the 
hidden ‘.syncany’ directory specific to the sync folders as well 
as user-specific  ‘Syncany’ directory in 
%Users%\<User Profile>\AppData\Roaming\, /home/<User 
Profile>/.config/, and /Users/<User Profile>/.config/ on the 
Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OSX clients (respectively). The 
former stores folder-specific configuration while the latter 
manages the user-specific configuration. Both the ‘.syncany’ 
and ‘syncany’ directories remained after uninstallation of the 
client applications. 
A. Sync and File Management Metadata 
Analysis of the ‘syncany’ located the last used PID for the 
daemon process in the %Syncany%/daemon.pid file, which 
could be useful information for file-to-process mapping i.e., 
dumping the memory space using the ‘memdump’ function of 
Volatility. The /%Syncany%/daemon.xml file held the folder 
metadata meant for the daemon process to identify sync 
directories. Each sync folder creates a ‘folder’ subtag in the 
‘folders’ property to hold the directory path and information 
about whether the folder is enabled in the ‘path’ and ‘enabled’ 
entries. 
Examination of the ‘.syncany’ directories revealed 20-
character machine and display names in the 
/%.syncany%/config.xml file, in the ‘machineName’ and 
‘displayName’ properties (respectively). The machine name is 
the random local machine name used to identify a 
computer/user for a repository, while the display name is the 
human readable user name for given local machine [62]. The 
file also described the type of backend storage in use in the 
‘type’ entry of the ‘connection’ property. Knowing the type of 
backend storage in use may enable a practitioner to extrapolate 
the potential artefacts in a Syncany investigation e.g., if the 
WebDAV protocol is used, the web server logs can be a 
potential source of relevant information. 
The server’s displayed name was located in the 
/%syncany%/logs/syncany.log, from the log entry “1-10-15 
18:52:20.274 | PluginSettingsP | main           | INFO : Setting 
field 'username' with value 'syncanyserver'”. Further details of 
the sync and file management metadata could be located in the 
‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table of the 
/%.syncany%/db/local.db database. Specifically, we recovered 
the unique identifications (ID), directory paths, file sizes, 
SHA1 checksums, and permission information (in POSIX 
format) for the sync folders and files specific to a repository in 
the ‘FILEHISTORY_ID’, ‘PATH’, ‘SIZE’, 
‘FILECONTENT_CHECKSUM’, and ‘POSIXPERMS’ table 
fields. The file checksum could enable identification of a sync 
file outside the sync folder i.e., when the file has been moved 
from the sync folder. 
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B. Authentication and Encryption Metadata 
Our findings suggested that the files of interest for the 
authentication and encryption metadata are in 
/%syncany%/config.xml, %.syncany%/config.xml, and 
/%.syncany%/master files. The /%syncany%/config.xml file 
records the masterkey and salt used to encrypt the sensitive 
information in the /%.syncany%/config.xml file [62], in the 
‘configEncryptionKey’ tag of the ‘userConfig’ property; 
useful when seeking to brute force the repo password stored in 
the ‘password’ tag of the ‘connection’ property in the 
/%.syncany%/config.xml file. Meanwhile, the 
/%.syncany%/config.xml file holds the plain text masterkey 
and salt used to derive the encryption keys for the folder-
specific data, in the ‘Key’ and ‘Salt’ entries of the 
‘masterKey’ property [62]. The master key could be located in 
/%.syncany%/master file as well. We also located the URL 
and server’s display name for the repository in the ‘url’ and 
‘username’ tags, respectively. 
C. Cloud Transaction History 
Inspections of the directory listings revealed the sync folder 
initialisation/addition time from the creation time of the 
‘.syncany’ sub-directory. Recalling the 
‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table of the %.syncany%/db/local.db 
database, we observed that records of the last modified and 
updated time could be located for the folder-specific sync 
directories/files in the ‘LASTMODIFIED’ and ‘UPDATED’ 
table fields, respectively. Sync directories/files that were 
modified could be differentiated from the ‘VERSION’ table 
column given the value of more than 1. Additionally, the view 
tables also held the directory/file modification status in the 
‘STATUS’ table field, indicating whether the sync 
directories/files were newly added (new), modified 
(CHANGED), or deleted (deleted). We could also determine 
machine names for the clients that made changes (e.g., add 
and remove files or sub-directories) to the repositories as well 
as the database local times associated with the changes, in the 
‘DATABASEVERSION_CLIENT’ and 
‘DATABASEVERSION_LOCALTIME’ table fields, 
respectively (see Fig.  2).  Examination of the 
/%syncany%/logs/syncany.log revealed the client application’s 
access times as well as file creation, modification, and deletion 
times of the sync folders/files, along with the corresponding 
property information. Details of the log entries of forensic 
interest are in Table III. 
Further examination of the Windows client determined that 
prefetch files could be differentiated from ‘SYNCANY-
LATEST-X86_64-2.EXE-FDCA2B01.pf’. The prefetch files 
provided information about the filename and full path for the 
executable file, number of times the application has been 
loaded, last run time, and other associated timestamps. We 
also located shortcuts to the loader files %Program Files 
(x86)%\Syncany\bin\launcher.vbs and %Program Files 
(x86)%\Syncany\unins000.exe at %ProgramData%\Microsoft\
Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Syncany\Syncany.lnk and %Pr
ogramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Sync
any\Uninstall Syncany.lnk (respectively), providing potential 
for alternative methods for identifying the application 
installation and last run timestamps. 
On the Ubuntu client, we observed that the installation 
created the log entry “2015-10-01 18:32:39 install syncany:all 
<none> 0.4.6.alpha” in the dpkg log. The installation also 
created the log entry “Oct  1 17:45:41 ubuntu 
AptDaemon.Worker: INFO: Installing local package file: 
/home/UbuntuPc/Desktop/syncany-latest.deb” in the system 
log (Syslog). Additionally, analysis of the Zeitgeist database 
(/.local/share/zeistgeist/activity.sqlite) revealed the directory 
paths for the sync folders/files in the ‘subj_url’ and 
‘subj_current_uri’ table fields of the ‘event_view’ table and 
original directory path in the ‘subj_origin_uri’ table field, 
which are undoubtedly useful in real world investigations. If a 
sync (download) file has been moved from the sync folder, 
then there are records remaining in the Zeitgeist database to 
enable identification of the sync files. We also recovered 
records of the types of actions made to the folders/files of 
relevance (e.g., Access, Create, Move, Leave, and Delete; 
each action creates a record in the database) in ‘interpretation’ 
table column, alongside the timestamps associated with the 
actions. Analysis of the Gnome’s /home/<User 
Profile>/.local/share/recently-used.xbel log located caches of 
sync directory paths accessed by the client application which 
included the last added, modified, and visited times in the 
‘bookmark’ property. Fig. 3 shows that the directory path as 
well as last added, modified, and added times could be 
differentiated from the ‘href’, ‘visited’, ‘modified’, and 
‘added’ entries in the ‘bookmark’ property. The figure also 
illustrates that a practitioner could identify the number of 
times the client application has accessed a sync folder and the 
application name from the ‘count’ and ‘name’ entries of the 
‘bookmark:applications’ property. 
 
Fig.  2. Portion of the ‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table recovered in our research. 
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D. Data Storage 
The sync directories could be discerned from directories 
containing the hidden ‘.syncany’ sub-directory. Analysis of 
the thumbnail cache located thumbnail images for the synced 
files in %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\ and 
/home/<User Profile>/.cache/thumbnails/large/ of the 
Windows and Ubuntu clients (respectively). The thumbnail 
cache could be differentiated from the thumbnail header 
property ‘jtEXtThumb::URI file:’ that referenced the directory 
path for the sync folder in the latter. The files deleted (locally 
and remotely) could also be recovered from the unallocated 
space/partition. 
E. Network Analysis 
Examination of the network traffic determined that only the 
server’s IP address could be recovered. A closer inspection of 
the network packets revealed copies of the response body of 
the WebDAV protocol’s PROPFIND HTTP method (i.e., 
“PROPFIND /webdav/<Repo Name>/actions/ HTTP/1.1”) 
which contained the URLs as well as last creation and 
modified times of the repositories (see Fig.  4). It was also 
possible to recover the master key salt from the PROPFIND 
HTTP methods “PUT /webdav/<Repo Name>/master 
HTTP/1.1” and “GET /webdav/<Repo Name>/master 
TABLE III 
ENTRIES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN  SYNCANY.LOG 
Relevance Examples of log entries 
Assists a practitioner in the 
identification of the server’s display 
name. 
 1-10-15 18:52:20.274 | PluginSettingsP | main           | INFO : Setting field 'username' with 
value 'syncanyserver' 
Assists a practitioner in identifying 
the repository initiation time for a 
sync folder, alongside the directory 
path and repository URL. 
 1-10-15 18:52:27.196 | ManagementReque | main           | SEVE : Executing InitOperation for 
folder /home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient ... 
 1-10-15 18:52:34.807 | WebdavTransferM | IntRq/SyncanyU | INFO : WebDAV: Uploading 
local file /home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/.syncany/master to 
http://172.16.38.180/webdav/UbuntuRepo/master ...  
Assists a practitioner in identifying 
the time when a sync folder is 
connected to an existing repository, 
including the directory path. 
 1-10-15 19:32:38.646 | ManagementReque | main           | SEVE : Executing ConnectOperation 
for folder /home/suspectpc/SyncanyWindowsDownloadToUbuntu . 
Assists a practitioner in identifying 
the sync file addition time, including 
the property information such as the 
filename, file version, as well as last 
modified and updated times. 
 1-10-15 19:26:14.015 | Indexer         | Thread-68      | INFO :    * Added file version:    
FileVersion [version=1, path=Enron3111.zip, type=FILE, status=NEW, size=30967, 
lastModified=Sat Dec 13 08:35:00 PST 2014, linkTarget=null, 
checksum=75a666ba87fef0f8425a71edcd621d0a4367aa47, updated=Thu Oct 01 19:26:14 PDT 
2015, posixPermissions=rw-r--r--, dosAttributes=--a-] 
Assists a practitioner in identifying 
the sync folder addition time, 
including the property information 
such as the directory name, folder 
version, as well as last modified and 
updated times 
 1-10-15 19:42:18.751 | FileSystemActio | NotifyThread   | INFO :     with winning version   : 
FileVersion [version=1, path=WindowsToUbuntu, type=FOLDER, status=NEW, size=4096, 
lastModified=Mon Sep 28 21:40:44 PDT 2015, linkTarget=null, checksum=null, updated=Thu 
Oct 01 19:42:10 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rwxr-xr-x, dosAttributes=----] 
Enables a practitioner in determining 
the deletion time of a sync folder. 
 1-10-15 20:14:17.091 | AppIndicatorTra | PySTDIN        | INFO : Python Input Stream: 
Removing folder '/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient' ... 
By searching for the ‘file’ tag, a 
practitioner can identify the 
filenames associated with a sync 
folder.  
 1-10-15 19:26:17.032 | AppIndicatorTra | Timer-0        | INFO : Sending message: 
<updateRecentChangesGuiInternalEvent> 
   <recentChanges> 
<file>/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.zip</file> 
<file>/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt</file> 
<file>/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.rtf</file> 
… 
   </recentChanges> 
</updateRecentChangesGuiInternalEvent> 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Portion of the recently-used.xbel log for the Syncany Ubuntu client application. 
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HTTP/1.1”. Since the master key salt is only created once 
during the repository initialisation or connection, the 
timestamp of which could reflect the sync folder creation or 
addition time. Undertaking data carving of the network traffic 
recovered the full repositories intact. However, it is 
noteworthy that the repository is encrypted by default, and 
hence accessing the repository may require the client 
application and encryption password.  
F.  Memory Analysis 
Examinations of the running processes using the ‘pslist’ 
function of Volatility indicated the process names, process 
identifiers (PID), parent process identifiers (PPID), as well as 
process initiation and termination times. Although the process 
name was masqueraded with ‘java.exe’, we could differentiate 
the PID from the last used PID recorded in the daemon.pid 
and syncany.log files. Examinations of the memory dumps 
using the ‘netscan’ or ‘netstat’ function of Volatility recovered 
the network information associated with the processes such as 
the host and server’s IP addresses, port numbers, socket states, 
and protocols, providing an alternative method for recovery of 
the network information. 
Undertaking data carving of the memory space of the 
Syncany daemon process, we recovered the files of forensic 
interest such as config.xml, syncany.log and local.db database 
intact. The presence of the data remnants in plain text also 
suggested that it is possible to texts from the files based on the 
log file entries and tag names for the configuration files. The 
%.syncany%/config.xml file could also be potentially carved 
from unstructured datasets, using the header and footer 
information of “3C 63 6F 6E 66 69 67 3E 0A…3C 2F 70 61 
73 73 77 6F 72 64 3E 0A 20 20 20 3C 2F 63 6F 6E 6E 65 63 
74 69 6F 6E 3E 0A 3C 2F 63 6F 6E 66 69 67 3E” in hex 
format or “<config>…. </connection>…</config>” in non-
unicode string format, but the findings may be subject to 
software updates. As for the records from the 
‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table of the local.db database, a 
search for the machine name (identified from the 
/%.syncany%/config.xml file) could enable future searches of 
the raw cell data in unstructured datasets. 
VI. SYNCANY ANALYSIS ON THE UBUNTU SERVER 
Examinations of the Syncany servers determined that the 
repositories were fully encrypted. Other than the master file 
(storing the master key salt for the sync data), it appeared that 
accessing the sync data is only possible with the Syncany 
client in possession of the repository password. The 
repositories did not necessitate the need for the server 
environment, and hence it was possible to rebuild the sync 
folders externally (e.g., in our forensic workstation). This can 
be done by running the ‘sy connect’ command or choosing the 
‘Connect to an existing online storage’ option on the GUI – 
similarly to the process of connecting to a repository from the 
desktop clients.  
An inspection of the Apache server log determined that the 
log entries for the HTTP requests made by the clients to the 
repositories were in the format “<Client’s IP address> - 
<Server’s name> [The time when the request was received] 
"<Request line>" <Status code> <Size of the repository 
object returned to the client> " –" "<User agent>"”. For 
example, we were able to determine the repository 
initialisation time from the log entry “172.16.38.132 - 
syncanyserver [01/Oct/2015:18:52:34 -0700] "PUT 
/webdav/UbuntuRepo/master HTTP/1.1" 201 480 "-" 
"Sardine/UNAVAILABLE"”. 
VII. REPORTING AND PRESENTATION 
A timeline of the data from the various sources was outlined to 
demonstrate the cloud transactions from the clients and the 
servers (see Table  IV). The complete timeline analysis is too 
broad to present fully in this paper; therefore, we only outline 
the timeline for the Enron3111.txt sample file from the 
Ubuntu client. 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we suggested an investigation approach for 
Syncany, a cloud-enabled big data platform, with the aims of 
reducing the required time and resources required in a real 
investigation. Specifically, we described the data remnants 
recovered from the use of Syncany private cloud storage 
service as a backbone for big data storage, such as config.xml, 
local.db, and syncany.log files on client devices. These files 
could provide the sync, file management, authentication, and 
encryption metadata essential for identifying the synced files 
and cloud hosting instance as well as correlating the cloud 
transaction records (e.g., file versioning datasets) for 
timelining user activities. The creation of the sync-folder-
specific ‘.syncany’ sub-directory suggested that a practitioner 
 
Fig.  4. An excerpt of the response body of the PROFIND HTTP method for the Syncany repository. 
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can identify the sync directory and the associated timestamps 
from the directory listing, as well as other OS-generated 
instances such as shortcuts, event logs, $LogFile, $MFT, 
$UsnJrnl, registry (‘RecentDocs’, ‘UserAssist’, ‘Run’, and 
‘ComDig32’ etc.), Zeitgeist and recently-used.xbel logs, and 
thumbnail cache. 
Our examination of the physical memory indicated that the 
memory dumps can provide a potential alternative method for 
recovery of the applications cache, logs, and HTTP requests in 
plain text. However, the encryption password was not located 
(on both the hard disk and memory dumps), suggesting that a 
practitioner can only obtain the encryption password via an 
offline brute-force attack or directly from the user. 
Nevertheless, a practitioner must keep in mind that memory 
changes frequently according to user activities and will be 
wiped as soon as the system is shut down. Hence, obtaining a 
memory snapshot of a compromised system as quickly as 
possible increases the likelihood of obtaining the encryption 
key. 
Analysis of the network traffic produced unique identifiable 
information such as URL references to the repositories and 
HTTP requests for the cloud transactions. We observed that 
the sync data were fully encrypted. This should perhaps not be 
surprising as Syncany fully encrypts the sync data before 
uploading to the offsite storage [62]. However, it is important 
to note that the artefacts may vary according to different 
network protocol implementations e.g., if the HTTPS protocol 
is used, then the HTTP requests will be fully encrypted.  
As expected, examinations of the Syncany servers 
determined that the offsite repositories were fully encrypted, 
TABLE  IV 
TIMELINE FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Source Key Date Event 
Type 
Comment 
Autopsy file List 2015-10-01 
01:14:41 
Created Created /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient. 
Autopsy file list 2015-10-01 
10:26:10 
Created Created /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt. 
Dpkg log 2015-10-01 
18:32:39 
Created Installed Syncany Ubuntu client application version 0.4.6.alpha - 
“2015-10-01 18:32:39 install syncany:all <none> 0.4.6.alpha” 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 
18:34:12 
Last run 1-10-15 18:34:12.064 | DaemonOperation | Thread-5       | INFO : Starting 
daemon operation with action RUN ... 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 
18:52:27 
Initialised Initialised repo for /home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient - 
 “1-10-15 18:52:27.196 | ManagementReque | main           | SEVE : Executing 
InitOperation for folder /home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient…” 
Autopsy file list 2015-10-01 
18:52:28 
Initialised Created repo /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/.syncany. 
local.db 2015-10-01 
19:26:14 
Created Node ‘UbuntuPc” (Machine Name=’UYCrwWXGXKvbOYKtZBGc’) added 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt. 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 
19:26:14 
Added Added /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt - 
“1-10-15 19:26:14.004 | Indexer         | Thread-68      | INFO :    * Added file 
version:    FileVersion [version=1, path=Enron3111.txt, type=FILE, 
status=NEW, size=2734, lastModified=Sat Dec 13 08:33:11 PST 2014, 
linkTarget=null, checksum=ceadc4b7d47af4125a68e03ec3141cb3fde407ff, 
updated=Thu Oct 01 19:26:14 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rw-r--r--, 
dosAttributes=--a-]” 
local.db 2015-10-01 
19:42:10 
Created Node ‘WindowsPc’ (Machine Name=‘PqPKcLWznojHZVLslgNo’) added 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu. 
local.db 2015-10-01 
19:42:10 
Created Node ‘WindowsPc’ (Machine Name=‘PqPKcLWznojHZVLslgNo’) added 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
Autopsy file list 2015-10-01 
19:42:18 
Created Created /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu. 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 
19:42:18 
Added Added /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu - 
“1-10-15 19:42:18.751 | FileSystemActio | NotifyThread   | INFO :     with 
winning version   : FileVersion [version=1, path=WindowsToUbuntu, 
type=FOLDER, status=NEW, size=4096, lastModified=Mon Sep 28 21:40:44 
PDT 2015, linkTarget=null, checksum=null, updated=Thu Oct 01 19:42:10 
PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rwxr-xr-x, dosAttributes=----]” 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 
19:42:18 
Added Added 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt - 
“1-10-15 19:42:18.848 | FileSystemActio | NotifyThread   | INFO :    + 
NewFileSystemAction [file1=null, file2=FileVersion [version=1, 
path=WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt, type=FILE, status=NEW, 
size=2734, lastModified=Sat Dec 13 08:33:11 PST 2014, linkTarget=null, 
checksum=ceadc4b7d47af4125a68e03ec3141cb3fde407ff, updated=Thu 
Oct 01 19:42:10 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rw-r--r--, dosAttributes=--a-]]” 
Autopsy file List 2015-10-01 
19:42:18 
Created Created 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
Autopsy file list; 
Trashinfo 
2015-10-01 
19:48:29 
Deleted Deleted 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
local.db 2015-10-01 
19:48:32 
Deleted Node ‘UbuntuPc” (Machine Name=’UYCrwWXGXKvbOYKtZBGc’) deleted 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
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and it appeared that accessing the sync data is only possible 
with the client application and the encryption password. In the 
case when physical acquisition is not feasible for the server, a 
practitioner can facilitate the data collection with logical 
acquisition of the data repositories. While the machine names 
could be located for the nodes associated with a Syncany 
repository, only the web application log could provide the IP 
addresses of the nodes. A summary of our findings is outlined 
in Table V. 
Collectively, our research highlighted the challenges that 
could arise during forensic investigations of cloud-enabled big 
data solutions. While the use of deduplication/chunking and 
encryption technologies can benefit users by providing an 
efficient and secure means for managing big data, evidence 
collection and analysis may necessitate intercepting and 
collecting password and utilisation of other vendor-specific 
applications. This can be subject to potential abuse by cyber 
criminals seeking to hide their tracks. Without the cooperation 
of the user (suspect), forensics endeavours may end up an 
exercise in futility. Therefore, we suggest the vendor to 
implement a forensically friendly logging mechanism (e.g., 
providing information about who accesses the data, what data 
has been accessed, from where did the user access the data, 
and when did the user access the data) that supports the 
collection of the raw log data outside the encrypted datasets by 
default. In a recent work, for example, Ab Rahman et al. [59] 
highlighted the importance of forensic-by-design and 
presented a conceptual forensic-by-design framework. 
Future work would include extending this study to other 
private cloud storage services such as Seafile to have an up-to-
date and comprehensive forensic understanding and facilitate 
in greening investigation of big data platforms. 
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